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Chapter 4
Existing Applications  
That Use TPMs
Even though more than 1 billion TPMs are deployed in the market, and they exist on almost 
all commercial PCs and servers, very few people know about them. And many people who 
do know about TPMs are surprised to discover that many applications are written for them. 
There are also a large number of ways to easily write applications that take advantage of 
TPM 1.2 devices. Because TPM 2.0 devices are just beginning to appear on the market, it’s 
perhaps not surprising that not as many applications can use TPM 2.0 directly. The purpose 
of this book is to enable you to write programs that take advantage of all the features of  
TPM 2.0, both basic and advanced.
This chapter starts by looking at the various application interfaces that are used by 
programs to interface with the TPM hardware. Then you examine a number of applications 
that already use TPMs. Perhaps the most interesting part of the chapter—and one we hope 
you will help make out of date—is a short list of types of programs that should use TPMs  
but don’t.
We follow up with some considerations that any programmer using a TPM must take 
into account, and a description of how some existing programs have handled them.
Application Interfaces Used to Talk to TPMs
A number of different types of applications have been written already for use with TPM 
1.2 and 2.0. These can be classified by the programming interface they use:
Proprietary applications written directly to the TPM (available for •	
both 1.2 and 2.0).
Legacy applications that use a middleware interface to talk with •	
the TPM, specifically Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) 
#11 and Microsoft Cryptographic Application Programming 
Interface (CAPI). When PKCS #11 stacks are available for TPM 
2.0, they work with it as well.  They are available for TPM 1.2 in 
all operating systems. Beginning with Windows 8, Microsoft has 
made its cryptographic interfaces able to use both TPM 1.2 and 
TPM 2.0.
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Applications that use the TCG Software Stack (TSS) interface •	
to talk with the TPM (multiple proprietary TSSs are available 
from IBM, Infineon, and NCP; an open source TSS code named 
TrouSerS is also available for multiple OSs). These are 1.2 
implementations. TSS 2.0 is in development.
Applications that use Java interfaces to talk with the TPM. So •	
far, only 1.2 implementations that interface between Java code 
and the TPM exist, but 2.0 versions should soon appear. Mobile 
devices, especially those running the Android OS, use Java 
interfaces.
Applications that use the Microsoft TPM Base Services (TBS) •	
library: These can be used with either TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0. Some 
functions work with either. Those that use new capabilities of the 
TPM 2.0 only work with it.
Microsoft TSS.net works with TPM 2.0 and comes with a TPM 2.0 •	
emulator! TSS.net is not compatible with the TCG standards, and 
only currently works on Microsoft products.
The first applications to use the TPM were proprietary applications that were shipped 
with the machines that had the first versions of TPMs. These included IBM’s password 
manager and file and folder encryption, which used the TPM to store encryption keys. 
Dell, HP, and Infineon have their own varieties of these applications. Generally speaking, 
they work well, but are intended to focus on very specific usage models.
The next type of applications that use TPMs use it through cryptographic service 
providers (CSPs). There are two main kinds: those that use CAPI and those that use 
the RSA Corporation’s PKCS #11. Any application written to use either of these APIs 
for cryptographic services can use a TPM via a standard means of pointing those 
cryptographic services to the TPM. Fortunately, most software that uses cryptography 
uses one of these two services, for good reason. Cryptographic services are notoriously 
difficult to program correctly, particularly if the programmer is worried about weak 
implementations that may be vulnerable to attacks such as side-channel attacks.1 The 
best practice is to rely on experts to write those cryptographic services. Additionally, 
those cryptographic services may be certified by NIST as providing validated services that 
behave as expected, and hence can be used in government institutions.
Both of these APIs contain hooks that allow other cryptographic services to be 
substituted for those done in software by the service. This lets software take advantage of 
a hardware interface that provides protection against software attacks by implementing 
cryptographic services in a separate memory space. Such CSPs are available for Windows 
for both CAPI and PKCS. These implementations are available from Security Innovation, 
Wave Systems, Infineon, and Lenovo for a fee. They’re often bundled with computers 
from major manufacturers. Infineon’s CSP is noteworthy in that it can find applications 
on the machine that can use its services and give the user the opportunity to use the 
1Side-channel attacks occur when the time or power it takes to perform a calculation can give hints 
to an attacker about what key is being used.
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TPM with them. In other OSs, such as Linux, BSD, MAC OS, and Solaris, PKCS #11 
implementations allow the substitution of TPM functions for public-key generation and 
random-number creation; these are available for free. Additionally, some companies, 
such as Charismathics, have made middleware suites that can use the TPM to provide 
cryptographic services.
The problem with using legacy interfaces (PKCS #11 and MS CAPI) is that they only 
utilize basic services available with a TPM, such as key generation and signing. Advanced 
applications that use the TPM’s ability to attest to the health of the machine or allow 
controlled migration of keys without exposing them in the clear aren’t available using 
these middleware solutions. As a result, TSS was created. An open source implementation 
called TrouSerS was implemented by IBM and ported to Windows by the University 
Politecnico di Torino in Italy.2 Proprietary implementations are also shipped by a number 
of companies. TSS is currently available for TPM 1.2; an updated specification and 
implementation are being developed for TPM 2.0.
The TSS library is much more suitable to C programming than Java programming. 
Therefore, some people at MIT created a Java interface to the TPM.  It is available from MIT.3
Microsoft, starting with Windows Vista, provides almost direct access to the TPM 
through a programming interface called TPM Base Services (TBS). The TBS interface 
accepts TPM-formatted byte streams and returns TPM-formatted responses or errors. Because 
this is a low-level interface, you’re expected to use one of the many libraries that convert  
high-level-language callable functions to the underlying TPM byte-stream representation.
TBS performs several additional functions. First, it provides multiprocess, 
multithread access to the TPM by “maintaining” an internal queue of commands 
submitted. Second, the TPM performs under-the-covers TPM context management 
by using the TPM context save and load commands. This allows TBS to present each 
application with a virtual TPM that appears to have essentially unlimited resources 
like key slots, and ensures that one application cannot interfere with the keys or slots 
created by another. Third, TPM commands are submitted via a TBS context, and TBS 
automatically cleans up resources when the context is closed or the process dies.
Windows also layers additional security mechanisms on top of the TPM’s 
administrative controls. The problem addressed is that the use of certain TPM commands 
can impact the stability or correct operation of the operating system or other applications, 
but the TPM commands are not properly protected by the TPM’s protection mechanisms. 
For example, most Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) should be updated only 
by the trusted computing base, but the TPM does not require special authorization to 
extend a PCR. In Windows Vista and 7, Windows limited TBS access to administrative 
applications only. In Windows 8, commands are grouped into three sets:
•	 No Access: Including TPM2_ContextSave and TPM2_ContextLoad
•	 Administrative-token processes only: Including TPM2_PCR_Extend 
and privacy-sensitive operations
•	 Standard-use access: Creation and use of keys, and so on
2http://security.polito.it/trusted-computing/trousers-for-windows/.
3http://projects.csail.mit.edu/tc/tpmj/.
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The set of standard-use and administrative commands can be edited by the 
operating system administrator. The OS keeps copies of the TPM’s authorization values 
in access-protected entries in the registry. This behavior is described in much more detail 
in the document Using the Windows 8 Platform Crypto Provider and Associated TPM 
Functionality.4
In addition to the low-level TPM access provided by TBS, Windows also exposes a 
subset of TPM behavior through five much higher-level interfaces.
TPM Administration and WMI
Windows exposes many common TPM administrative tasks through GUI tools and 
through a scriptable and remote programming interface called Windows Management 
Instrumentation (WMI). This interface lets an administrator switch on TPMs, clear them, 
disable them, and so on. It transparently supports both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0.
The Platform Crypto Provider
Most Windows programs use cryptography through a set of interfaces called Cryptography 
Next Generation (CNG). CNG provides a uniform library for performing both  
software-based and hardware (such as High Security Module) based cryptography. 
Windows 8 lets you specify the TPM as a key protector for a subset of TPM-supported 
cryptography by specifying use of the Platform Crypto Provider. The Platform Crypto 
Provider has been extended to include a few specific TPM-like behaviors, such as quoting 
and key certification.
Virtual Smart Card
Windows 8 further extracts the TPM to behave like a smart card in any and all cases where 
a smart card can be used. This includes both enterprise and web logon.
Applications That Use TPMs
Table 4-1 lists applications that are currently available that use the TPM, along with the 
interface they use and the OS on which they run. All these work with TPM 1.2. Some of 
them, as noted, also work with TPM 2.0.
4http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/downloads/74c45746-24ad-4cb7-ba4b-
0c6df2f92d5d/.
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Table 4-1. Applications and SDKs That Use TPMs, by Interface and OS
Application Type Application Name Interface OS
VPN StrongSwan clients (used 
in Linux, BSD, Solaris, and 
so on)
TrouSerS (1.2) Linux





Microsoft embedded VPN 
or DirectAccess can directly 
use either TPM 1.2 or TPM 
2.0 in Windows 8.




Checkpoint Firewall VPN 
can use the TPM.
(1.2)
TypeSafe (TPM-backed TLS). jTSS (1.2) Linux
Attestation Wave Systems Embassy 
client/ERAS server package.
TrouSerS (1.2) Windows
Wave Systems Endpoint 
Monitor
TrouSerS (1.2) Windows
Strong Swan TNC solution 
hooked to the TPM with PTS.
(1.2) Linux
NCP’s Secure VPN GovNet 
Box (a separate box 
interposed between a 
computer and the network 
that establishes a secure 




JW Secure has written an 
application that is Kerberos-
like for Windows.
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Table 4-1. (continued)
Application Type Application Name Interface OS
TPM Quote tools 
(SourceForge)
TrouSerS (1.2) Linux, 
Windows
TrustedGRUB Direct (1.2) Linux
TVE Trousers(1.2) Linux
Tboot Direct(1.2) Windows, 
Linux
Flicker Direct / Trousers (1.2) Windows
Full disk 
encryption
Microsoft BitLocker Microsoft TBS TPM 
Base Services (1.2, 2.0)
Windows
dm-crypt Direct (1.2) Linux, 
Android
SecureDoc
File and folder 
encryption
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) PKCS #11 (1.2) Windows
OpenPGP PKCS #11(1.2) Linux
E-mail Thunderbird for encrypted 
e-mail and signed e-mail
PKCS #11(1.2) Windows, 
Linux
Outlook MS CAPI(1.2, 2.0) Windows
Web browsers Internet Explorer MS CAPI(1.2, 2.0) Windows
Firefox PKCS #11(1.2) Windows
Linux
Chrome PKCS #11(1.2) Windows
Linux
TPM Manager TPM Manager 
(SourceForge)
microTSS (1.2) Linux
5See Ellen Messmer, Network World (2010), “PwC Lauds Trusted Platform Module for Strong 
Authentication,” www.networkworld.com/news/2010/091510-trusted-platform- 
authentication.html.
As the table demonstrates, many applications use TPMs. There are even some large 
companies that use them.5 BitLocker is one of the most widely used of these programs that use 
extended capabilities of the TPM. Wave Systems Embassy Suite is another. Often, conflicting 
management software requires multiple TPM programs to be used on the same system.
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With a 1.2 TPM, there was a single storage root key (SRK), which had to have an 
authorization that was shared by all applications using the TPM. Unfortunately, there 
was not unanimity in how to create the SRK—it could be created without needing any 
authentication, needing only a well-known secret of 20 bytes of 0, or needing the hash of 
a well-known secret for its password. Additionally, there was an owner authorization that 
was somewhat sensitive, because it was used to reset the dictionary attack mechanism as 
well as reset the TPM or create an attestation key (thought by some to be privacy sensitive).
Unfortunately, the owner authorization was also used to authorize allocation of  
non-volatile RAM space, which meant applications that needed to allocate nonvolatile RAM 
space had to know it. But if a different application took ownership of the TPM and set the 
owner authorization to a random number, protected by a back-end management function,  
it was unknown even to the end user. Some applications did this. If applications did not know 
how to coordinate with that back-end management application, they could not function.
The result was that the user was restricted to using a single suite of applications 
with the TPM, in order to allow all applications to have access to the authorizations they 
needed. In practice, this meant software that directly used the TPM had to be from the 
same developer as the management software used to set up the TPM.
This issue was somewhat mitigated when using only PKCS #11 or MS CAPI enabled 
applications, because they only required that there be a single application for managing 
the TPM; but they also couldn’t use the higher functions of the TPM, such as attestation. 
This problem seems to be gradually disappearing. For example, Wave Systems software 
can manage TPMs for attestation and also for BitLocker.
TPM 2.0 still requires some coordination for authorization; but it lets you use 
multiple SRKs with the TPM, allowing completely separate applications to use the TPM 
with less coordination.
In researching applications that use the TPM, most of the use cases that come 
quickly to mind are supported by commercial software. However, some obvious use cases 
for software that uses a TPM, don’t seem to exist in the marketplace.
Applications That Should Use the TPM but Don’t
In the past few years, the number of web-based applications has increased. Among them 
are web-based backup and storage. A large number of companies now offer such services, 
but as far as we are aware, none of the clients for these services let the user lock the key 
for the backup service to a TPM. If this were done, it would certainly be nice if the TPM 
key itself were backed up by duplicating it on multiple machines. This appears to be an 
opportunity for developers.
Another application that has become more useful recently is remote management. 
Many companies now offer ways of allowing one computer to “take over” management of 
another computer. For instance, you can use this functionality to monitor your network 
remotely or to give troubleshooting advice to remote members of your family. But again, 
the security models we are familiar with, use passwords to gate the remote access. 
Although long, hard-to-remember passwords can provide some security, they aren’t fun 
to use. This seems to be an ideal place for TPMs to be used—restricting remote access to 
machines that have been linked together with public/private keys. There do not appear to 
be any commercial applications that use the TPM for this—most commercial applications 
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don’t even support use of other cryptographic devices, including smart cards, for 
increased security. This is not due to lack of software development kits for writing such 
software, because several of these kits exist.
Building Applications for TPM 1.2
When you’re building an application that will use a TPM, it is important to first decide if 
you are going to use the advanced facilities of the TPM beyond those that are exposed by 
PKCS or MS CAPI. If not, then it makes the most sense to write your application to these 
interfaces. This way, your application can be used on those machines with and without 
TPMs. But to use unique TPM features such as attestation, extended authorization, 
localities, an NVRAM locations, you have no choice but to use one of the custom  
TPM interfaces.
A number of API libraries are available for writing applications using custom interfaces. 
TSS 1.2 had a reputation for being hard to learn, so other suites were developed. TPM/J was 
developed at MIT to provide an object-oriented means of programming to the TPM.6  
Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communication (IAIK), of Graz 
University also delivered a version of Java integration with the TPM through trustedJava.7 
Sirrix provided a microTSS, an attempt to simplify the TSS specification.8
Additionally, command-line tools for the TPM were released by IBM together 
with a TPM emulator on SourceForge. As a result, it was possible to exercise TPM base 
commands in batch file.
Microsoft’s TBS interface started out as a basic interface with the TPM, but its API 
is growing, and it may turn into a very nice means of programming TPMs. The biggest 
news in TBS programming came in Windows 8, where the TBS interface abstracted the 
difference between TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 so that all the APIs work with either chip. This is 
particularly useful for applications that use only those APIs, but it doesn’t (yet) expose the 
new functions in the TPM 2.0 specification. TSS.net, which Microsoft also released, lets 
all commands be sent directly to the TPM, although it doesn’t, as yet, have a high-level 
interface for the new TPM 2.0 commands.
TSS.Net and TSS.C++
Windows 8 and TPM 2.0 were released before there were standards for TPM programming. 
To fill this gap, Microsoft developed and open sourced two libraries that let application 
programmers develop more complicated TPM-based applications than CNG or virtual 
smart cards allowed.
TSS.Net and TSS.C++ provide a thin veneer over TPM 2.0 for both managed code (such 
as C#) and native code (C++) applications. Both libraries allow applications to be built for a 
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Although the TSS.Net and TSS.C++ libraries are low level, the authors have made 
every effort to make programming the TPM easy. For instance, here is a complete 




    // Create a TpmDevice object and attach it to the TPM. Here you
    // use the Windows TPM Base Services OS interface.
    TpmTbsDevice device;
 
    if (!device.Connect()) {
        cerr << "Could not connect to the TPM device";
        return;
    }
 
    // Create a Tpm2 object "on top" of the device.
    Tpm2 tpm(device);
 
    // Get 20 bytes of random data from
    std::vector<BYTE> rand = tpm.GetRandom(20);
 
    // Print it out.
    cout << "Random bytes: " << rand << endl;
 
    return;
}
 
All of these interfaces work, but of course some, such as TBS, are specific to the 
Windows OS. If you want to write programs that are portable to other OSs, you are better 
off with one of the others. For TPM 1.2, TSS was the interface with the broadest OS 
adoption. The next section considers an application that was written using TSS to take 
advantage of advanced TPM functions.
Wave Systems Embassy Suite
Wave Systems has written software to a TPM-specific interface, rather than to a higher-level 
interface such as PKCS #11. It needed to be done that way, to take advantage of the 
TPM’s attestation capabilities. Because these capabilities aren’t addressed in any other 
crypto-coprocessor, they aren’t available in standard interfaces such as PKCS #11. Wave 
Systems uses the TCG TSS interface implemented in TrouSerS to talk to the TPM, manage 
the TPM owner password, create attestation identity keys (AIKs), and attest to those 
values via a standard called Trusted Network Connect, which communicates back to 
an administrative server. This server notices when PCR values have changed, and it can 
send alerts to IT staff when that happens. Some PCRs (like 0, which represents the BIOS 
firmware) should not change, unless the BIOS of a device has been upgraded, an event 
that IT should be aware of. TSS 1.2 was available for Windows, Linux, Solaris, BSD, and 
even the MAC OS. TSS 2.0 will be a good selection for the same reasons, if you want to be 
able to port your code to other OSs.
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TSS 2.0 has been designed specifically with the aim of making programming TPM 
2.0 as easy as possible. It is designed in layers so that at the lowest level, direct access to 
the TPM is still possible. Common design patterns that use a cryptographic coprocessor 
are made particularly easy to use at the highest application level programming interface. 
However, there are still some ground rules that every application developer should 
remember when developing applications that use a TPM.
Rocks to Avoid When Developing TPM Applications
When using the TPM in an application, there are two major pitfalls to avoid. First, the 
TPM (or another component on the motherboard) may die, or users may upgrade their 
equipment. If the motherboard is replaced, any keys that are locked to the TPM go away. 
Second, if data is locked to PCRs (a process called sealing), and the things measured into 
the PCRs are updated, that data is no longer unsealable.
Both of these problems amount to the same thing: management of the keys and data 
locked to a TPM needs to be carefully considered. An example of how do this well is found 
in Microsoft’s BitLocker application, which first came out with Windows Vista Enterprise.
Microsoft BitLocker
Microsoft gave careful consideration to both of the previously described problems when it 
created the BitLocker application, originally embedded in the Enterprise edition of Vista. 
This program was used to do full-disk encryption of the hard disk on which Windows 
resided. To do this, early in the boot sequence BitLocker obtained a key from the TPM. 
This key was sealed to PCRs that represented the boot sequence of the computer up to 
the point where the kernel was loaded into memory. BitLocker could also require the 
user to enter a password. To enable management of the encryption key used for full-disk 
encryption, the sealed key was used as a key encrypting key (KEK) and used to encrypt 
the full-disk encryption key. The actual key used for the full-disk encryption key could be 
then backed up by also encrypting it using a very long random password. This password 
could be kept secure elsewhere (for example, on a USB key locked in a safe). This way, 
if the motherboard was replaced, the TPM died, or the hard disk was moved into a new 
system, the data stored on it was still accessible.
Additionally, Microsoft gave thought to the problem caused by people upgrading 
their BIOS. Such an upgrade prevented the TPM from being able to unseal the KEK. 
Although the random-number backup sufficed for recovery in this case, Microsoft 
decided it would make more sense for an administrator doing the BIOS upgrade, who 
already had access to the decrypted data, to have a means to temporarily leave the full-
disk encryption key in the clear while the BIOS upgrade was performed and then reseal it 
to the TPM’s new PCR values after the BIOS upgrade. It is important to realize that making 
things easy for the user at a small cost to security (leaving the drive open for the brief time 
while a BIOS upgrade was taking place) is usually a good tradeoff. Security that is hard to 
use is seldom used.
When IBM came out with its first TPM solutions, several years before BitLocker saw 
the light of day, it also had to keep manageability problems in mind.
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IBM File and Folder Encryption
IBM had a similar problem when it allowed storage keys to be used for file and folder 
encryption to the TPM, and it solved the issue in a similar way. Instead of generating a 
random number, IBM wanted to let users type the answer to questions in order to recover 
the disk encryption key; this key was normally encrypted with the KEK, which in turn 
was protected by the TPM. This can be dangerous, because it may allow an attacker to 
simply try many answers to these questions in the hope of generating the correct answer 
and unlocking the drive. IBM’s solution to this problem was clever. The company realized 
that although in normal use the key needed to be available almost immediately, in the 
case of recovery, it was fine if it took several minutes to recover the data. Therefore IBM 
performed a hash operation on the answers to the questions over and over again until 
a few minutes had passed, noted the number of operations, and then used the resulting 
value as a key to encrypt the file and folder encryption key. It then stored the number 
of operations and the encrypted blob on the hard disk. In order to decrypt this blob, 
someone had to spend several minutes for every attempt to answer the questions. This 
quickly becomes impractical for an attacker, but it costs a user only a few minutes in the 
case of recovery.
When TPM 2.0 was being designed, the architects had experience with the multitude 
of problems caused by managing TPMs, so new features were built into 2.0 to help solve 
these issues. One specific problem that is encountered repeatedly in security software 
is the need to manage authorizations (passwords). For example, someone changes a 
password while on a plane or late at night at a hotel, when they aren’t connected to the 
network; then, the next day, they can’t remember their password. Or someone working 
for a corporation quits or (worse yet) dies and leaves important corporate data encrypted 
on their hard disk without telling anyone their password. IT organizations are assumed 
to be able to fix problems like this—but it’s hard to see how they can. TPM 2.0 enhanced 
authorization was designed to help fix the issue of managing passwords.
New Manageability Solutions in TPM 2.0
Programs to solve the manageability problem can use the same techniques used with 
TPM 1.2 devices; but with TPM 2.0, a number of new solutions are available. Loss of a 
password or authorization is unfortunately a big issue in the industry—in an enterprise, 
many people forget their passwords or lose their smart cards every day. There’s no shame 
in admitting it: we’ve all done it.
Generally, setting up a certified key on a TPM takes some effort, but doing this during 
provisioning time in TPM 2.0 is much easier. If users need their TPMs reprovisioned in 
the field, this burdens IT staff. Because IT staff are major players in computer purchasing 
decisions, the architects of the TPM specification needed to solve this problem. The TPM 
2.0 design allows management not just of keys (so they can be duplicated on other TPMs), 
but also of authorizations; this is demonstrated in detail in the chapter on enhanced 
authorization. For now, suffice it to say that major TPM 2.0 enhancements were designed 
to solve this problem.
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Summary
In this chapter, you have seen that many different software interfaces can be used to take 
advantage of TPM capabilities, and many currently available applications use TPMs. 
Some of these only take advantage of standard capabilities such as those in any crypto 
coprocessor—creating, storing, and using keys. These basic interfaces, such as MS CAPI 
and PKCS, exist in a large number of applications. Taking advantage of higher-level 
capabilities, such as those used in attestation software, requires talking to TPM-specific 
interfaces instead of generic cryptographic interfaces. There are several of those for TPM 
1.2 and currently at least two, Microsoft TBS and TCG’s TSS, for the TPM 2.0 interface.
Finally, you saw that when creating applications that use a crypto coprocessor 
such as a TPM, there are rocks to avoid: the cryptographic processor may die, or a 
motherboard to which it’s attached may have to be replaced. Even worse, the only user 
who knows a password may become unavailable. For the sake of manageability, you need 
a strategy to recover functionality after such an occurrence. Enhanced authorization, a 
new feature in TPM 2.0, meets this need; it is explained in chapter 14.
To continue your journey into the TPM 2.0 universe, in the next chapter we kick-start 
your ability to read and understand the TPM 2.0 specification.
